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F unctionalists argue that the "problem of other minds" has a simple solution, namely, that one can ath'ibute mentality to an object iff an object func­tions in a particular mamler: given certain inputs, 
certain outputs will occur. For human beings, we simply 
need to observe their behavior and we can safely attribute 
mentality to them since, according to functionalism, mental 
states just are functional states. If we accept the functional­
ist account of the mind, we certainly have no problem of 
other minds. In fact, it recently has been argued1 that since 
functionalism does solve the "problem of other minds," we 
should accept it as the best theory of mind. I will argue, 
however, that the ability to solve the problem of other 
minds is not a sufficient reason to accept functionalism. 
Moreover, I will argue that functionalism is an incomplete 
theory of mind, that behavior is not the solution to the 
problem of other minds, and finally, that we need not re­
vert to radical skepticism concerning the problem of other 
minds. 
Elliot Reed has recently argued that because a func­
tional account of the mind solves the problem of other 
minds, it is surely the best account of mind. If mental states 
just are functional states then there should be no worries 
about whether or not the people we see every day have 
conscious mental experiences. However, is this a sufficient 
reason for accepting a functional account of the mind? I 
think it is not. I find it odd that we should accept any the­
ory of mind because of its pragmatic value alone. In other 
words, it seems to me that just because functionalism gives 
us an apparent solution to the problem of other minds we 
should not assume it is the correct theory, especially if there 
are sufficient reasons for rejecting functionalism, which I 
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think there are. First, then, I want to show how functional­
ism does not follow from its ability to solve the problem of 
other minds. 
It is worth noticing something about the nature of 
the problem of other minds, namely, that it is an epistemo­
logical problem, which is to say that we want to know 
whether others have minds. Our concern with ascribing 
mentality to others is an epistemological one. Now, if we 
consider the philosophy of mind, we quickly realize that we 
are -not concerned so much with epistemology, but meta­
physics, that is, what the mind really is. Elliot Reed recently 
argued that because functionalism solves this epistemologi­
cal problem of other minds, we should accept it. However, 
how does any theory of mind, that is, a metaphysical the­
ory, follow simply from its apparent ability to solve an epis­
temological question? Quite simply, it does not. I am cer­
tain that the correct theory of mind may indeed solve the 
problem of other minds, and in fact discoveries about real­
ity certainly do help us in answering epistemological con­
cerns. The mere utility of the theory, however, is not a suf­
ficient reason to prove that the theory is correcL 
Elliot Reed see,ms to start his investigation into the 
mind by asking how can we know other minds. He con­
cludes that only a functional account of the mind provides 
us with a solution. Therefore, he concludes, a correct ac­
count of the mind must be a functional account. His argu­
ment looks to me like the following: 
1. We have a problem in that we cannot know if others have 
minds. 
2. Traditionally, citing others' behavior has solved the prob­
lem. 
3. 	This solution only works if we accept a functional ac­
count of the mind. 
4. 	Therefore, a correct theory of the mind must be func­
tional. 
I think it is obvious that this a bad argument. 
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There are at least two problems with it. First, we can have 
serious doubt as to whether the third premise is true, and 
second, even if it were true, the conclusion simply does not 
follow from the premises. Let us assume for now that func­
tionalism is the only theory that uses behavior to solve the 
problem of other minds.2 111ere are still two premises that 
need to be added to the above argument. For the argument 
to be valid, the argument would need to look like this: 
1. We have a problem in that we calIDot know if others have 
minds. 
2. Traditionally, citing others' behavior has solved the prob­
lem. 
3. Citing other behavior is the solution to the problem of 
other minds 
4. The correct theory of mind must solve the problem of 
other minds 
5. This solution only works if we accept a functional ac­
count of the mind. 
6. Therefore, a correct theory of the mind must be func­
tional. 
Now if these added premises are correct, and we as­
sume that what is now the fifth premise is correct, then it 
seems to me the conclusion does follow. However, why 
should we accept premises three or four? Let me consider 
these premises in reverse order. The fourth premise as­
sumes that the correct theory of the mind necessarily solves 
the problem of other minds. But why? There is simply no 
good reason to think that the correct account of mind will 
solve the problem of other minds. Let us assume, however, 
the correct theory of mind will solve the problell1 of other 
Ininds. The argument still fails since we can resist the third 
premise. It seems to me that the validity of the third prem­
ise is assumed and not obvious. I do not know of any argu­
ment that shows behavior is the only possible solution to the 
problem of other minds. Perhaps what is much more prob­
lematic with this argument is that it begs the question. No­
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tice that the third premise can be stated as a premise iff one 
knows something about the mind, namely, its ontology. 
The third premise can be assumed iff a functional account 
is assumed, which is circular since it is functionalism that 
the argument seeks to prove. In other words, why would 
you accept the third premise if you did not first accept a 
functional account of the mind? In fact, I do not think any 
solution to the problem of other minds is possible unless 
one first has the correct ontology of mind. How could we 
solve the problem if we do not yet know what the mind is? 
If we do not know the ontology of the min.d how can we 
determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for men­
tality? The very fact that one would accept behavior as the 
solution to the problem of other minds reveals that one has 
already assumed at least one necessary feature of mentality, 
namely, behavior.3 
I think the problem is that Reed approaches the phi­
losophy of Inind with the epistemological problem of other 
minds dictating what theory of mind is correct. The oppo­
site should occur. We should first seek the ontology of 
mind, then seek to solve the epistemological problem of 
other minds. If we let the epistem.ological problem drive the 
ontological project, we are only doing so out of utility. If 
this occurs, then the philosophy of the mind becomes pri­
marily an epistemological project (which it clearly is not), 
and we are concerned not with what the mind really is, but 
only with whether it satisfies our curiosity about the exis­
tence of other Ininds. 
In short, functionalism does appear to give an ac­
count of how we can know whether others have minds, but 
there is no good reason to suppose that such account is suf­
ficient to give us the correct ontology of the mind. If func­
tionalism is correct, it is because it correctly describes the 
ontology of the mind, not because it satisfies Ollr epistemo­
logical concerns. Surely, if functionalism is correct, it is not 
because it can solve the problem of other minds, but because 
mental states are functional states. The utility of any correct 
theory of mind is a nonessential characteristic of the the~ry, 
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and not the criterion on which we should accept or dismiss 
the theory. 
So far, I have sought not to show that functionalism 
is false, but rather to show that a theoretical solution for the 
problem of other minds is not sufficient to prove any theory 
of mind. I do not think many functionalists would disagree 
with what I have argued so far. It seems just plain obvious 
that a solution to the problem of other minds is not suffi­
cient to prove a theory of mind. If it were sufficient, then on 
what grounds are we to favor functionalism over other 
theories that maintain behavior is the solution to the prob­
lem of other minds?4 If functionalism is to be preferred over 
other theories, such as philosophical behaviorism, then it 
must be because it correctly describes the ontology of men­
tal phenomena5• That to say, if functionalism is to be pre­
ferred over philosophical behaviorism, then it must be be­
cause mental states are not wholly translatable into terms of 
behavior, but rather, mental states just are functional states. 
So what about functionalism as a correct theory of 
mind? I have shown how Reed's initial argument does not 
prove functionalism to be correct. More importantly, how­
ever, I think it can be shown that there are good reasons to 
reject functionalism as an incomplete theory of the mind. I 
will only mention two arguments here. 
Reductio ad absurdum 
If mental states just are functional states, then it 
seems to me that we could ascribe mentality to virtually 
everything. Functionalists maintain that something is a 
mind just in case it functions like a mind. If this is true, it 
does not take long to notice that we can ascribe mentality to 
virtually everything since even a pencil falling off a table 
can be described in purely functional terms. On this ac­
count, we may even ascribe intentionality to the pencil, 
which it clearly does not have. The error of functionalists 
here is the failure to distinguish between 1/ as-if intentional­
ity" and genuine intentionality (Searle 78--82). If we can as­
cribe mentality to anything, then this is clearly a reductio ad 
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absurdum that functionalism cannot avoid. 
Reed has responded to this problem by saying that 
the problem lies not with functionalism, but our notion of 
consciousness as it is used in language. However, this is 
unlikely since the fallacy occurs precisely when we use 
functional language to account for mentality. If mental states 
just are functional states, then the number of things to 
which we need to ascribe mentality is ridiculously high. 
The problem lies neither in our conception of consciousness 
nor in linguistic alnbiguity, but in the functional account of 
mentality. 
Absent Qualia 
Perhaps the best argument against a functional ac­
count of the mind is the'Absent Qualia Argument'. The ar­
gument is as follows: 
1. 	 At least some mental phenomena - the sensation of see­
ing red, for example - have qualitative content (qualia); 
2. 	 Any correct theory of mind must account for qualia; 
3. 	 Functionalism leaves out qualitative content completely; 
4. 	 Therefore, functionalism is an incomplete theory of the 
mind. 
I know of no response from any functionalist that ade­
quately addresses this problem. In fact, it seems to me that 
qualia are usually h"ivialized by functionalists in order to 
disarm the 'Absent Qualia Argument'. For example, Reed 
has recently argued that, if we must account for qualia, 
then the problem of other minds is unsolvable since we 
could never distinguish between people with qualitative 
conscious experiences and zombies. This epistemological 
problem of other minds, as we have seen above, is not a 
sufficient reason for accepting or rejecting an ontology of 
mind, and so also it is l~ot a sufficient reason for discarding 
qualia from an account of mind. Perhaps it is true, though I 
suspect it is not true, that including qualia makes the prob­
lem of other minds unsolvable, but the correct theory of 
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mind must account for qualia since we do know that qualia 
are intrinsic to at least some mental phenomena. If qualia 
are intrinsic to at least some mental phenomena, then why 
would we accept an account of the mind that leaves qualia 
completely out? If it is merely to satisfy the problem of 
other minds, then that is not an adequate reason. It is im­
portant here to notice that functionalists trivialize qualia as 
if they were insignificant characteristics of some mental 
phenomena. Qualia, however, are not theoretical items in 
folk psychology. We do not postulate qualia; we experience 
them (59). Qualia are just a plain fact in at least some men­
tal phenomena. We cannot account for mental phenomena 
without including qualia. If this inclusion means that we 
cannot solve the problem of other minds, then that is sim­
ply an unfortunate consequence of the nature of minds. 
Functionalists like Reed will undoubtedly disagree at 
this point. How can we ignore the problem of other minds? 
He might dig his heel in the ground and insist that this is a 
crucial question and that including qualia simply makes the 
problem unsolvable. I think I have shown that he is wrong 
to approach the philosophy of mind by trying to solve an 
epistemological problem. Nevertheless, Reed might insist 
that we need to prove others have minds. The mistake of 
functionalists and, I think, many philosophers, is to assume 
that mentality needs to be observable to exist. On the con­
trary, I think it can be shown that behavior does not solve 
the problem of other minds. Notice that if behavior is not 
the solution, then functionalism is false since being func­
tionally equivalent does not necessitate ascribing mentality 
to something. 
I think the best argument on this subject is John Searle's 
Chinese Room Argument? In fact, I think it is a knock-out 
blow to functionalism altogether. However, I will mention 
three other thought experiments that Searle uses to show 
that consciousness is independent of behavior. 
Searle asks us to imagine the following. Your brain is 
deteriorating in such a way that you are losing your eye­
sight. With teclmological and medical expertise" doctors re­
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store your vision perfectly by plugging silicon chips into 
your visual cortex. Now imagine your entire brain is con­
tinuing to deteriorate so that doctors slowly continue to im­
plant more silicon chips until your whole brain is entirely 
replace by silicon chips. If this were to happen, at least 
three outcomes are possible. First, we may imagine that the 
silicon chips have perfectly duplicated all mental phenom­
ena, including qualia and consciousness. 
A second possibility is that the silicon chips have 
failed to duplicate your conscious experience and that you 
are losing control of your external behavior. You find that 
when doctors ask you if you can see the object in front of 
you, you want to tell them you can see nothing since you 
are going blind. Still you have no control over your behav­
ior and you find yourself, against your own will, saying 
that you do see the object. Your conscious experience con­
tinues to diminish while your external behavior remains 
the same. 
Finally, it is possible that the silicon chips have per­
fectly duplicated all conscious experiences, but that your 
external behavior diminishes to paralysis. You have the ex­
act same mental experiences as before. When the doctor 
asks you if you see the object he is holding in front of you, 
you cannot give any sign that you do in fact see it. Because 
the doctor sees no external behavior to indicate mental ex­
periences, he may conclude that you have no mental life at 
all, although you know you do (68). 
These three thought experiments establish at least 
the following. First, we may conclude that consciousness is 
independent of behavior. This is demonstrated by the sec­
ond scenario in which one may act as though one had con­
scious experiences, but in fact did not, and the third sce­
nario in which one may have a full mental life, but not be 
able to externally demonstrate it through behavior. These 
thought experiments also demonstrate that the ontology of 
the mental is essentially a first-person ontology and that 
U epistemically speaking, the first-person point of view is 
quite different from the third-person point of view." (70) 
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I hope it is clear from the above thought experiments 
that a functional account of mind, which holds that mental 
states are to be understood purely in terms of inputs and 
outputs, is untenable and, moreover, that behavior (the out­
put in functional theory) is not the solution to the problem 
of other minds. What then of the problem of other minds? 
Are we left doomed to be skeptical about whether our fel­
low human beings have minds? We have already seen that 
consciousness is independent of behavior; does that leave 
us with an unacceptable problem? 
I think the best approach to the problem of other minds 
currently available to us is common sense. Now notice I am 
not proposing the best solution, but rather the best approach 
currently8 available. For example, how do I know my dog 
has a mind? John Searle insists that we can be sure of a 
dog's conscious experiences because we can both observe 
behavior that is appropriate to having mental states and see 
that the causal basis of the behavior in the dog's physiology 
is similar to our own (73). Although this may seem uncon­
vincing, we make this sort of inference everyday when we 
assert the principle that the same causes have the sam.e ef­
fects or that similar causes have similar effects. We can see 
that the physiology of the dog is similar to ours, and, there­
fore, we can recognize the causal basis for mental states. 
Again, we can suppose that other humans have mental 
states similar to our own both because their physiology is 
very similar to our own and because their behavior is ap­
propriate to having mental states. I think it is worth adding 
that the problem of other minds really is not an everyday 
problem. As Searle points out, it is only a problem for phi­
losophers. We just do not go through our everyday life seri­
ously questioning the existence of conscious experiences in 
other people simply because we do not observe their con­
sciousness. Why would we, since consciousness is essen­
tially a first-person ontology? We cannot observe the men­
tality of others simply because mental phenOlnena are onto­
logically subjective. 
At this point, some philosophers, perhaps Reed, would 
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insist that although the problem of other minds is not really 
a problem in everyday life, philosophers do see this as a 
problem that needs to be solved. Well, if Searle is correct 
that consciousness fs caused by the behavior of the mi­
crolevel biology of the brain, then once we have a mature 
neuroscience, we should be able to identify what neuro­
physiological phenomena are both necessary and sufficient 
for consciousness (74). If this were to occur, then the prob­
lem of other minds would vanish completely. 
I think I have shown that the epistemological problem 
of other minds is not a sufficient reason for accepting any 
account of mind, let alone a functional account, and that 
functionalism itself is an incomplete theory of mind. Fi­
nally, I think it has been shown that behavior is not the so­
lution to the problem of other minds and that denying that 
behavior is the solution need not lead us into radical skepti­
cism regarding other minds. I think a common sense ap­
proach to the problem of other minds is appropriate until 
we give neuroscience time to grow out of its infancy. If this 
is an unsatisfactory approach to the problem of other minds 
for .functionalists like Reed, then this d.issatisfaction seems 
to testify only to the pragmatic value of functionalism and 
not its veracity. 
Notes 
1See Reed, EHiot. "Functionalism, Qualia, and Other Minds". Epistenle 
2002. 
2 Both Philosophical Behaviorism and Functionalism maintain behavior 
is the solution to the "problem of other minds." Therefore, some other 
criterion is needed to prefer one to the other. This alone demonstrates 
that solving the "problem of other minds" is not sufficient for a correct 
theory of mind. I think, however, th.c'lt this argument is overkill since I 
have already shown that choosing a theory of mind on purely prag­
matic grounds is the wrong way to approach the entire discussion. 
3 I think it is just plain obvious that behavior does not solve the problem 
of other minds and that the only way to maintain that is does is to beg 
the question of the ontology of mind. 
4 I .hope the problems with Reed's argument are clear. His problems are 
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even greater since many theories of mind cite behavior as the solution 

to the problem of other minds. 

5 I find it eXh'emely odd that any philosopher of mind would start with 

an epistemological question concerning other minds. If we start with 

this question, we dearly are not concerned with what is, but rather 

what theory we can us to address our skepticism. 

6See Searle, 1980. 

7 I think that this is probably the most convincing argument against 

functionalism and I am aware of no response to Searle on this matter. If 

ever there were a fatal blow to a theory of mind, this is certainly it. 

S II Approach" is not semantically equivalent to "method." By 

"approach" I mean something closer to "attitude." If Searle is con-ect­

and I think he is - then we simply do not have a mature enough neuro­

science to solve this problem quite yet. Until then, we can use common 

sense not to prove others have minds, but be confident that others experi­

ence mental states similar to our own. 
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